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Abstract: “Function” is a vitally important concept in the 
scientific community. Scientists use it to describe and address a 
wide variety of research problems. In publications, however, 
scientists within and across disciplines interpret function 
differently. For example, intense debate surrounds what 
percentage of the human genome should be deemed "functional” 
rather than “junk DNA.” In this essay, we analyze the use of 
function in the research of de novo gene birth, a budding scientific 
field that studies how novel genes can emerge in non-genic 
sequences. Our research team, composed of a rhetorical scholar, 
philosopher, structural biologist and systems biologist, crafts a 
taxonomy of how “function” is variously constituted in de novo 
gene birth publications, including as expressions, capacities, 
interactions, physiological implications and evolutionary 
implications. We argue function is shaped by the diverse onto-
epistemological perspectives of scientists and is both a recalcitrant 
and resilient concept of scientific practice. Informed by Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s writings on a scientific mode of 
thinking, functions are time-space scales of objects under 
investigation that make possible references to scientific 
measurements.   
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The Human Genome Project is currently considered the 
world’s largest collaborative biological project. It clarified 
the order of chemical bases in the human genome and 
created maps to show the locations of genes for major 
sections of human chromosomes. In 2003, after the 
Human Genome Project was complete, biologists 
continued to collaborate to create an encyclopedia of 
human DNA elements. As of 2019, this work is still 
ongoing. Scientists working on encyclopedia, “ENCODE,” 
are composing a comprehensive list of “functional elements 
in the human genome” by integrating a variety of 
biochemical and computational techniques (Project 
overview, n.d., para. 1). 
In 2012, the ENCODE project released a substantial set of results, 
which included the announcement that 80% of the human genome 
was biochemically functional. However, shortly thereafter, 
evolutionary biologists who were not a part of the ENCODE project 
contested this number (Graur et al., 2013). Scientists from a range 
of disciplines proposed different percentages that varied from 5% to 
90% (Laubichler, Stadler, Prohasha, & Nowick, 2015). These 
discrepancies within the scientific community did not concern the 
data. More data would not lead to agreement. The problem was 
with the concepts forming the research question: How much of the 
human genome is functional? In this question there are at least 
three concepts worthy of rhetorical attention. 
The first is human. Who or what counts as human? What are the 
boundaries of the human species? How much genetic variation is 
there across humans? And whose DNA can represent the human? 
Contemporary rhetorical scholars regularly engage questions 
concerning humanity and human nature (McCann-Mortimer, 
Augoustinos, & LeCouteur, 2004; Wilson & Lewiecki-Wilson, 2001; 
Young, 2015).  
The second concept is genome. How do different scientific fields 
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understand the gene? What can a gene mean? How has the 
definition of gene evolved? Scholars studying the rhetoric of 
science, medicine and technology engage these questions by 
illuminating the political dimension of genetic discourses (Condit, 
2008; Heppe, 2013; Zerbe, 2019). 
However, it is this last concept in the question “how much of the 
human genome is functional?” that ignited the ENCODE debate, 
and it is the concept that has received the least rhetorical attention. 
Function is a vitally important and consequential concept for the 
scientific community. It is among the most significant biological 
concepts because it describes how processes of life work. What 
counts as a function, however, is not agreed upon across or within 
scientific fields. Does a chemical transformation count as 
functional? Or does that chemical transformation have to influence 
population dynamics over successive generations? The ENCODE 
debate is one instantiation of this ongoing philosophical 
disagreement that demonstrates different interpretations of 
function among scientists. 
Philosophers of science have written extensively on the concept of 
function since the early 1960s, particularly regarding the theoretical 
relationship between function and teleology in evolutionary 
processes (Mossio, Saborido, & Bergareche, 2009; Nagel, 1961; 
Roux, 2014). However, while the theoretical context of function “is 
frequently discussed, less attention is paid to the role of 
measurement, i.e., the assignment of numbers to attributes of the 
natural world,” what Manfred Laubichler, Peter Stadler, Sonja 
Prohasha, and Katja Nowick (2015) describe as “measurement 
context” (para. 15). The majority of philosophical writings concerns 
what function should mean and the legitimacy of a given definition, 
but they eschew questions concerning what meanings are in 
circulation and how those meanings come to be in circulation 
through measurement procedures—distinctly rhetorical questions. 
By prioritizing proper meaning over practical use, the 
philosophical debates have not resolved interpretive confusion 
among scientists. This is particularly apparent in emerging fields 
where scientists from a range of disciplines participate in 
knowledge production using diverse techniques and technologies to 
attain their measurements. The diversity in both training and 
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practice create different conceptualizations of function. Similar to 
McGreavy’s (2019) argument about cycles, different uses of 
function create “competing claims” about “whose knowledge 
counts.” This not only hinders efforts to make sense of large 
amounts of data in the life sciences that can be used to address 
health and disease, but it also has gatekeeping implications 
(Doolittle, 2018). Disagreement about function impacts individual 
researchers because genomic sequences deemed “functional” are 
more worthy of publication, become a part of reference databases, 
enhance grant proposals, and support tenure and promotion.  
Given these reasons, there is growing recognition that function 
cannot be treated as a general theoretical concept across the life 
sciences (Doolittle, Brunet, Linquist, & Gregory, 2014; Laubichler 
et al., 2015). Function adapts to disciplinary environments, and 
research publications evidence this polymorphic quality. The field 
of de novo gene birth offers a particularly relevant example for 
understanding function’s diversity since it is an emerging field of 
evolutionary biology with manifold uses of function that are not 
often clarified. 
Scientists in the field of de novo gene birth study how novel genes 
can emerge in non-genic sequences (Van Oss & Carvunis, 2019). 
This is distinct from other well-studied areas of evolutionary 
biology where biologists investigate how novel genes derive from 
ancestral ones, such as through mutations in their genomic 
sequences. Scientists researching de novo gene birth come from a 
variety of disciplines, including but not limited to biochemistry, 
genomics, genetics, systems biology, developmental biology, 
evolutionary biology and protein biology. The background that 
scientists bring to the study of de novo gene birth, including 
education, methodological approaches, and disciplinary practices, 
imbues them with differing norms for what counts as functional. 
Additionally, the emergence of novel functional genes can be 
associated with the emergence of novel molecular or even 
organismal functions (Ding, Zhou, & Wang, 2012), and as 
technology develops scientists can measure different biological 
properties and thus have new understandings of the word function 
(Kellis et al., 2014). 
Our interdisciplinary research team addresses problems with 
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function by analyzing discourse in the field of de novo gene birth. 
Specifically, we attend to issues of measurement context to enhance 
science communication. Function, we propose, refers to the time-
space scales of objects under investigation. In this way, function is a 
concept that prescribes limits to forms and orients scientists to 
onto-epistemological planes of reference, the measurement context 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1991).  
We utilize the interpretive diversity of our interdisciplinary 
research team to discern the time-space scale patterns within the 
published discourse of de novo gene birth. We are four women, 
trained in four different disciplines—rhetoric, philosophy, 
structural biology and systems biology—and three different 
nationalities—US, Mexican, French. Our diverse training offers 
nuanced understandings of the available uses of function as both 
theoretical and measurement context. 
We argue current measurement practices in de novo gene birth 
indicate at least five time-space scales of function that constitute 
this field’s plane of reference: expression, capacity, interaction, 
physiological implications, and evolutionary implications. 
Scientists who reference time-space scales enhance the durability 
and portability of their measurements across and within their fields 
(St. Amant & Graham, 2019). Durability and portability are 
qualities of a recalcitrant reality where nature endures in a way that 
can be referenced by others. However, the time and space scales of 
function that make reference possible change based on evolving 
scientific practices and tools. Thus, functions are epistemologically 
recalcitrant when scientific practice maintains a plane of reference, 
but as scientific paradigms are ruptured functions are resiliently 
reborn (Stormer & McGreavy, 2017). 
We understand resilience as an entity’s ability to adapt to 
changing environmental conditions, as developed in ecology 
(McGreavy, 2016). In this way, function adapts to changing 
research environments and practices. This contrasts a notion of 
resilience that is popular in public discourse where an object can 
persist unchanged despite changing environmental conditions. 
Returning to the ENCODE debate, a scientist who advocates for a 
singular notion of function is assuming that the concept of function 
does not adapt to a changing scientific landscape and that it can 
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persist unchanged. A scientist who assumes there is only one 
proper use of function would be protecting a particular disciplinary 
notion of function.  
We proceed by discussing the most popular conceptualizations of 
function in the philosophy of science and their limitations; we 
continue by explaining our analytic approach to de novo gene 
discourse and the resulting functions that emerge from our 
analytical apparatus; and we conclude by addressing the 
contributions of an interdisciplinary rhetorical approach to the 
discourse of function. This essay amplifies the importance of 
understanding rhetorical discourse as a product of time and space. 
Scientific practice, and practice more broadly, creates time-space 
“objects” to be referenced, an epistemological recalcitrance that is 
contingent upon ontological resilience.  
Conceptions of Function in the Philosophy of 
Science 
Function has been present in the study of biology since the 
emergence of the field and before the study of evolution (Allen & 
Neal, 2019). However, the meaning of function is not consistent 
across the life sciences. Philosophers interested in biology and 
biologists interested in philosophy continue to debate what 
function should mean, with the primary goal of justifying proper 
definitions.  
Two philosophical conceptions of function gained notoriety in the 
late 20th century for their broad application; these have been 
described as “causal role” and “selected effect,” defined below. 
When the ENCODE consortium released their data to report how 
much of the human genome was biochemically functional, 
philosophers of biology used these two conceptions of function to 
explain why there were such varying interpretations.  
Scientists working on the ENCODE project, who suggested 80% 
of human DNA was biochemically functional, derived their 
definition of function from a causal role perspective. The causal role 
function “emphasizes what an entity does” (Laubichler et al., 2015, 
para. 1). Causal role stresses predictable behavior. It describes what 
an entity can do, based on what it is observed to do, and concerns 
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causes of behavior.  
However, those who critiqued ENCODE’s conclusions supported a 
selected effect perspective of function. This understanding 
prioritizes the reason a biological object was selected in the 
evolutionary process, sometimes described as the “purpose” of the 
object. Biologists who conceptualize function as selected effect 
estimate much smaller percentages of human genome functionality 
than the ENCODE consortium, less than 10%. From this 
perspective, the function of the biological object “is the effect for 
which it was selected by natural selection or by which it is 
maintained” (Laubichler et al., 2015, para. 1). Selected effect is 
backward looking, describing not what an entity does but “why” an 
entity behaves as it does as a result of environmental conditions 
(Laubichler et al., 2015, para. 1). The term presumes the studied 
item or trait has an inherent purpose and proper function that 
nature selected. This sense of purpose makes selected effect prone 
to teleological interpretations, whether or not it is intended.  
These basic descriptions of selected effect and causal role 
oversimplify much of the nuance that philosophers discuss in their 
justifications for proper meanings of function. There have also been 
various other conceptions proposed (Griffiths, 1993; Mossio et al., 
2009). However, these philosophical conceptions have had little to 
no practical impact on scientists’ writing practices.  
When scientists publish empirical data they rarely make their 
philosophical commitments regarding function explicit (Allen & 
Bekoff, 1995). Philosophical commitments are not durable in the 
same way as empirical data; according to Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari (1991), they endure differently. Philosophical conceptions 
of function are not empirically testable; they are explanatory (Allen 
& Bekoff, 1995). The portability of knowledge claims is contingent 
upon the social, intellectual, and environmental conditioning of 
other scientists interpreting the research.  
Science Functions as Limits 
The durability of philosophical claims is different from the 
durability of scientific claims and this affects their portability. This 
section will overview issues of durability and portability with regard 
to function, specifically the ways scientists are able to reference 
 
Keeling 
Garza 
Nartey 
Carvunis 8  POROI 15,1 (January 2020) 
 
time and space scales to create similar working conditions. 
According to Deleuze and Guattari (1991), there is a distinction 
between function as a philosophical concept and function as an 
empirically testable reference. Understanding this distinction can 
help scholars think about the difference between a theoretical 
context and measurement context (Laubichler et al., 2015). We 
summarize the writings of Deleuze and Guattari on the differences 
between philosophy and science as distinct modes of thought and 
how a scientific mode of thought creates limits on time to enable 
measurement. Limits constitute Deleuze and Guattari's notion of 
function as a scientific tool for creating references. This notion of 
function informs our understanding of de novo gene functions as 
time-space scales, to be discussed in the next section. 
Philosophy, which addresses theoretical context, and science, 
which addresses measurement contexts, are distinct modes of 
thinking. A person is not exclusively a philosopher or a scientist, 
instead each person thinks philosophically and scientifically 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1991). Philosophical thinking has infinite 
movements; it attempts to retain infinity in its concepts. Telos, for 
example, is a concept that transcends time and space infinitely. It 
exists on a plane of immanence where time is infinite. Scientific 
thinking, on the other hand, tries to slow infinity down, to cut it up 
into a system of coordinates that can be used for reference. Science 
does this by creating functions, which are mathematical in their 
most basic sense. For Deleuze and Guattari (1991) a function is a 
limit that regulates infinity. 
Time is qualitatively infinite; it is the duration of all forms and 
shapes that will ever exist. However, a scientific mode of thought 
turns quality into quantity; it attempts to create epistemological 
recalcitrance. Clocks and calendars, for example, regulate time. The 
second, the minute, and the hour are all limits that create 
boundaries and coordinates; these limits are the functions, 
according to Deleuze and Guattari (1991), which make 
measurements in time possible. Even as we measure very fast 
speeds, like the speed of light, this is still a slowing down of time 
because time is otherwise infinite. Time does not actually slow 
down or have limits, but scientific functions impose limits. 
Time can be cut up with limits in all sorts of ways. Normalized 
systems of time can be regulated differently. A solar calendar is 
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different from a lunar calendar is different from a lunisolar 
calendar; religious calendars are different from fiscal calendars. 
Each calendar depends on different delimitations of time, 
relationships that could be attended to differently. Scientific 
instruments and computational programs create their own limits 
on time. Once limits are adopted, measurements can proceed, and 
the measurements are used to create logical propositions in science. 
A function that is assigned to a time-space relationship creates 
objects. Those objects—variables—can then be put into relationship 
with other functions to create propositions, a spatial relationship in 
time. The proposition refers to a system of coordinates established 
by time limits. Functions make it so that all speeds are subject to 
the same limits, and so that qualitatively different things can take 
on a quantitative identity that makes measurements possible. From 
measurements, scientific propositions can be crafted by creating a 
relationship between a previously established function and a new 
variable. For example, if we say y is a function of x, our 
understanding of y is dependent on previously established limits of 
x. Both y and x are limits established by a community to create 
propositions. Functions are therefore both limits and propositions 
supporting a system of reference. 
Reference is what is required for durable and portable 
communication between scientists. By adopting similar functions, 
scientists can refer to similar patterns of time-space, what Deleuze 
and Guattari (1991) call the plane of reference. It may be useful to 
think of planes as fields, such as the field of de novo gene birth. The 
plane of reference is the field’s system of limitations, a functional 
system of coordinates, which “carries out a preselection that 
matches forms to the limit” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1991, p. 121). As 
scientists create new functions, based on new tools, instruments, 
and practices, the plane of reference ruptures and breaks, and 
planes—fields—are resiliently remade. Communication is itself 
limited by functional agreement, by the same functions being used 
to constitute the plane of reference. However, scientists from 
different fields, and even scientists within the same fields, cannot 
completely stabilize the plane of reference because practices, tools, 
and the qualitative entities under investigation are never exactly the 
same, they are always entangled in different worldly relations 
(Barad, 2007). 
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Scientists from different fields are not necessarily concerned that 
they work on different planes of reference; “The highly specialized 
nature of organized science produces regions of discourse that can 
be isolated from one another even if carried out in close 
geographical proximity” (Lyne, 1995, p. 263). A quantum physicist 
does not need to work on the same plane of reference as a 
biochemist. While some functions will be similar, others will be 
unique to the field. However, different planes of reference become 
more problematic when scientists from different fields attempt to 
create epistemological recalcitrance together. 
Since the late 20th century, there has been an increase in 
interdisciplinary work to collaborate on large-scale projects, such as 
genome sequencing and environmental health. These 
collaborations are bringing together scientists with different skill 
sets, practices, analytical instruments and computational tools, and 
with them, different functions to constitute their planes of 
reference, which are the measurement contexts.  
A measurement context is distinct in each disciplinary approach 
to biology. The ENCODE consortium clarified their understanding 
of this after receiving different disciplinary responses to their 
announcement about human genome functionality: each branch of 
biology, they explained, “relies primarily on different lines of 
evidence indicative of function” (Kellis et al., 2014). Clarifying these 
different lines of evidence or limits, as Deleuze and Guattari (1991) 
would call them, enables a more recalcitrant plane of reference and 
measurement context to enhance both disciplinary and 
interdisciplinary work. In this way, functions may demonstrate 
recalcitrance or they may resiliently adapt to the changing working 
conditions of scientists. We turn now to a specific case study of 
discerning measurement contexts by attending to the discursive 
practices of scientists in the field of de novo gene birth. 
Functions of De Novo Gene Birth 
The field of de novo gene birth serves as an interesting case for 
studying measurement contexts of function for three reasons. First, 
it’s a newer area of study in the sciences, developing in the late 20th 
century, just as resilience discourse was garnering academic 
attention (Holling, 1973). Unlike fields that are multiple centuries 
old and have more or less garnered consensus around their use of 
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function, such as the field of Functional Morphology, there is no 
consensus about what is functional in de novo gene birth. Second, 
since it is a recent field, scientists are approaching their work from 
a range of disciplinary perspectives (e.g. biochemistry, systems 
biology, evolutionary biology), so it serves as an excellent case in 
assessing the range of functionality used in the sciences. And third, 
it is the study of novel gene birth and directly engaged questions of 
emergence, the transition from one type of element (not a gene) to 
another type of element (a new gene), which not only complicates 
the definition of gene in scientific discourse, but also creates 
possibilities for new understandings of functions.  
In crafting this analysis as an interdisciplinary team, it was 
important for us to understand our different disciplinary 
perspectives, to use mixed methods, including a rhetorical 
approach and a content analysis, and to publish our results in both 
rhetoric and science journals (Keeling, Garza, Crenshaw, & 
Carvunis, 2019). Over the course of our three-year collaboration, 
the humanists learned about molecular evolution, while the 
scientists learned about rhetoric and philosophy. Based on our 
interdisciplinary readings and theoretical discussions, we crafted an 
initial taxonomy of the uses of function in the field of de novo gene 
birth. To assess the quality of the taxonomy, we conducted an 
analysis of 20 abstracts in the field of de novo gene birth that 
included the word ‘function’ at least once. For the content analysis, 
we drafted intercoder reliability rules for assessing context and 
tested our model. After analyzing a group of abstracts, we discussed 
our interpretations, came to a consensus, revised the taxonomy 
where necessary, and reread abstracts to reinterpret and revise the 
taxonomy. 
We catalogued and interpreted each instance according to our 
evolving taxonomy individually, then discussed our reasoning as a 
group and came to a consensus regarding the time-space scales 
being referenced by the functions. We did not analyze instances of 
function where function was used to describe a bioprocess rather 
than the activity of a molecular object under investigation (DNA, 
RNA or protein objects). When an object of investigation was 
identified but no measurement context was given, we used the 
category “vague.” 
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Vague indicates that sufficient evidence was not found to infer 
one or more time-space scales of function, or to derive a new one. 
This category exemplifies the way function is used within the field 
of de novo gene birth without clarifying measurement context. 
Lothar Wissler, Jurgen Gadau, Daniel Simola, Martin Helmkampf, 
& Erich Bornberg-Bauer (2013) demonstrate a vague use of 
function when they state that “Orphans are an enigmatic portion of 
the genome since their origin and function are mostly unknown” 
(emphasis ours). In this instance, function is not given a time-space 
scale that could be discerned through an experiment, tool or 
method within the abstract, and therefore not recognizable as a 
measurement context on the plane of reference. We can understand 
such instances as conveying philosophical conceptions of function 
without explicitly identified theoretical contexts. The reader is 
expected to have a similar understanding of function, even though 
their disciplinary training, techniques, and methodology may be 
different. 
We identify five time-space scales of function that do evidence 
measurement context: expression, capacities, interactions, 
physiological implications, and evolutionary implications. Each 
refers to different relationships of time and space of the object 
under investigation. Functions co-exist since they are different 
ways of tracing coordinates on the plane of reference. Thus, some 
instances of function refer to two different measurement contexts, 
which will be evidenced below in our example for both expression 
and capacities. 
Expression is the presence or amount of the object under 
investigation (RNA or protein object), or the presence or amount of 
its transcription or translation products (DNA object). Gene 
expression is a highly regulated process that varies across cell types 
and over the life cycle of the organism. Thus, expression refers not 
only to the object's presence but also its quantity, the timing of 
production and the sub-localization (i.e. specific organelles, cell 
types, tissues, organs) of the object within the organism. For 
example, in the study of songbirds, Morgan Wirthlin, Peter Lovell, 
Erich Jarvis, and Claudio Mello (2014) “performed a comparative 
analysis of 48 avian genomes to identify genomic features that are 
unique to songbirds, as well as an initial assessment of function by 
investigating their tissue distribution” (emphasis ours). Tissue 
distribution refers to a mapping of the specific tissues in which the 
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gene products, in this case RNA, are detected. Function as 
expression is the limit placed on the object of investigation and has 
a relationship with detectability, a human’s ability to measure it. 
Whereas functions as expression have a relationship to presence, 
capacities are a relationship of composition. Capacities are intrinsic 
physical properties of the object under investigation: the necessity 
of the object’s behavior given an environment. Capacities refer to 
any and all of the object’s molecular properties. For a protein object 
this would include hydropathic index, charge, 3D structure, or 
conformational dynamics. In the same study on songbirds, Wirthlin 
et al. (2014) also performed “the initial assessment of function by 
investigating … predicted protein domain structure” (emphasis 
ours). If we analogize proteins as beads on a string, where each 
bead represents a different amino acid building block, the structure 
of a protein domain is the way the chemistry of those beads and 
their environment drives them to come together and form an 
overall shape or fold. Proteins with a similar fold tend to have 
similar interactions. 
Interactions are physical contacts, direct or indirect, between the 
object under investigation and the other components of a system, 
including contacts that mediate chemical transformations. Whereas 
the time-space scale of capacities entails compositional 
relationships, interactions are relationships with other objects. 
Interactions are evidenced by Michal Brylinski (2013) when 
discussing mouse proteins: “A subsequent structure-based function 
annotation of small protein models exposes 178,745 putative 
protein-protein interactions with the remaining gene products in 
the mouse proteome, 1,100 potential binding sites for small organic 
molecules and 987 metal-binding signatures” (emphasis ours). This 
study investigates three types of interactions with protein objects: 
the binding of proteins to one another, to small molecules, and to 
metal ions. Functions that refer to time-space scales based on 
interactions may indicate participation in larger systems. 
Physiological implications are the object’s involvement in 
biological processes. The object’s involvement in a biological 
process is enabled by a set of its capacities, interactions and 
expression patterns, independent of cross-generational 
considerations. Dan Li, Zhihui Yan, Lina Lu, Huifeng Jiang, and 
Wen Wang (2014) provide an example of a de novo-originated 
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gene, MDF1, participating in a biological process. They write, 
“MDF1 functions in two important molecular pathways, mating and 
fermentation, and mediates the crosstalk between reproduction and 
vegetative growth” (emphasis ours). Mating and fermentation, as 
well as reproduction and vegetative growth, are biological 
processes. These processes are named based on their surmised end 
goal. Thus, MDF1 has physiological implications because it 
supports the integration of reproduction with vegetative growth. 
Physiological implications, as functions, refer to the time-space 
scales of systemic relationships, distinct from populations across 
generations. 
  Evolutionary implications are the object’s influence on population 
dynamics over successive generations, as enabled by its 
physiological implications and their interplay with environmental 
pressures. Frequently, evolutionary implications describe whether, 
how and how much the object impacts fitness. Jorge Ruiz-Orera et 
al. (2015) discuss the evolutionary implications of transcripts: “In 
general, these transcripts show little evidence of purifying selection, 
suggesting that many of them are not functional” (emphasis ours). 
The authors have analyzed the DNA sequences for these transcripts 
and did not find much evidence that populations of these sequences 
are being purged of deleterious mutations by natural selection. This 
suggests that changes to the sequences of these transcripts are not 
harmful and that the existence of these transcripts is not a 
requirement for successful reproduction.  
Together, the field of de novo gene birth employs at least five 
functions. These time-space scales indicate different measurement 
contexts. Each is constituted by relationships that attempt to 
establish epistemological recalcitrance: expressions are 
relationships to presence; capacities are relationships to 
composition; interactions are relationships to other objects; 
physiological implications are relationships to systems; and 
evolutionary implications are relationships to populations across 
generations. This time-space scale taxonomy varies in its relational 
complexity, from expression to evolutionary implications. The 
taxonomy is a “spatial arrangement of action” within the field of de 
novo gene birth (Stormer, 2004, p. 262). It demonstrates the 
system of coordinates that constitute function’s measurement 
contexts. These contexts are the “cartography of persuasion” 
(Stormer, 2004, p. 262); they are what make for convincing 
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propositions in this specialized field. 
Conclusion 
Our rhetorical analysis of discursive practices in the field of de novo 
gene birth offers a recalcitrant and resilient understanding of 
functions as time-space scales. From the perspective of Deleuze and 
Guattari (1991), science takes the qualitative difference of nature 
and turns it into quantitative identity by cutting it up into 
functions. Functions are put in relationship with other functions to 
create a system of coordinates that then make propositions 
possible. While functions vary within and across disciplines, 
functions within a particular field may be similar to those in 
another field if they share the same scientific practices that shape 
their time-space scales. Scientific practices produce planes of 
reference that aim to achieve epistemological recalcitrance. To 
communicate, scientists must produce recalcitrant functions on a 
plane of reference, even while there are no guarantees for how long 
that plane can be maintained.  
As limits placed on infinity, functions can be reconstructed again 
and again; this is the resilient quality of scientific practice. New 
measurement contexts will emerge with innovations to scientific 
practice and the evolution of the natural world. There seems to be, 
then, an interesting relationship between the recalcitrance and the 
resilience of biological functions.  
The relationship between recalcitrance and resilience is similar to 
metaphor and catachresis, respectively. Recalcitrance, as a 
metaphorical movement, anchors an object of study within a 
context and gains additional perspective through its relationship to 
other vehicles. The anchor’s transformation is recalcitrant, even as 
it has been affected by changing relationships. Resilience, on the 
other hand, moves like catachresis. It is the abuse of context, from 
the Greek abusio, misuse, regularly confused with metaphor 
(Fahnestock, 1999). It is a particularly useful trope when a proper 
relationship does not exist, such as when new practices rupture the 
plane of reference. The plane, composed of functions, must be re-
coordinated in a way that is improper to previously conceived 
planes of reference. The catachrestic representation proposes “a 
structure for a combined space-time manifold, that literally 
[makes] no sense from the perspective of prior theories of space 
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and time” (Krips, 1999, p. 53). Functions are both recalcitrant and 
resilient, moving at the pace of science.  
A consequence of the scientific mode of thinking, however, is that 
once time is divided and measured, it lacks unity. Science cannot 
unify the plane of reference; that which is cut up is no longer whole, 
and so science is necessarily reductionist. Nonetheless, for many 
people, there is still a desire to tell a story about scientific 
measurements, even if that story will be incomplete and ongoing. 
This is the aspirational dimension of functions—the hopes and 
desires of what functions can do for the human condition. For 
some, functions are asked to confess that there is no purpose in life, 
for others, functions confess that there is. Philosophical 
elucidations over the concept of function often find their way into 
obfuscating measurement contexts for these aspirational reasons. 
As such, we wonder of philosophical concepts and scientific 
functions: which are more recalcitrant and which more resilient? 
Copyright © 2020 Diane Marie Keeling, Patricia Garza, Charisse 
Michelle Nartey, and Anne-Ruxandra Carvunis. 
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